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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACK C. DANIELS, et al.,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Defendants.
JACK C. DANIELS,

Case No. 86-0466

Third-Party Plaintiff,
and Appellant,
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS &
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants and
Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association being
also Respondent.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the work performed by defendant/third-party

plaintiff/appellant, Jack C. Daniels, on the job site on December
1, 1981, sufficient to establish that day as defendant's last day
of work from which the time for filing lien begins to run?
2.

If the foregoing issue is resolved in favor of the

appellant, that will be determinative of the case; however, if it
is resolved in favor of respondent, then the following issue still
remains:

Where mortgagor (trustor of trust deed) is estopped,

through its conduct, from raising the defense that the mechanics
lien was not timely filed, is subsequent mortgagee (beneficiary of

trust deed) who acquires its interest in the property from said
mortgagor, and subsequent to recording of Notice of Lien, likewise
estopped to assert such defense?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by plaintiff, CEN Corporation,
against Daniels and certain other defendants on or about February
25, 1982, by filing of Complaint whereby plaintiff sought to
cancel of record a mechanics lien filed by defendant/third-party
plaintiff/appellant, Jack C. Daniels (hereinafter referred to as
"Daniels"), together with certain other relief not relevant to
this appeal (R.l-8).

Defendant Daniels filed an Answer and

Counterclaim (R.35-37) seeking foreclosure of the said mechanics
lien, and thereafter filed an Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim (R.84-85).

Daniels was thereafter granted leave to further

amend and filed an Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third-party
Complaint (R.144-152) adopting his original Answer and
Counterclaim, the aforesaid Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim
and asserting a third-party claim against Deseret Federal Savings
& Loan Association and certain others, all of whom who asserted
claims to the property, whereby Daniels sought to likewise have
the mechanics lien foreclosed as against the interests of said
parties.
Defendant, Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association
(hereinafter referred to as "Deseret"), filed a Motion to Dismiss
(R.160-161) for alleged failure of Daniels to state a claim
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against it (in the Third-Party Complaint) upon which relief could
be granted.

The said Motion to Dismiss was briefed and orally

argued to the Court, and the lower Court rendered a Memorandum
Decision (R.233-240) granting the Motion to Dismiss and thereafter
entered an instrument entitled "Summary Judgment," (R.243-245)
whereby the Court ruled:
" . . . the Motion to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant,
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, be and the
same hereby is granted and judgment is rendered in its
favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff, Jack C.
Daniels, no cause of action."
That judgment was entered on April 26, 1984.
Thereafter, Daniels filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
Summary Judgment (R.248-250), the same having been timely served
on April 4, 1984. That motion was argued to the Court on June 4,
1984, at which time the Court denied said motion.

Daniels asked

the lower court to certify the said Summary Judgment as a final
judgment, but the Court denied that request and the Minute Entry
reflects as follows:
"Mr. Madsen asks for final order of !no cause of action1
re Rule 54(b). Court denies same indicating Supreme
Court is to determine what is appealable." (R.257)
Written Order Denying Motion to Alter and Amend was
entered by the Court on June 18, 1984. (R.259-60)

Accordingly,

Daniels filed Notice^of Appeal (R.267-269) to this Court on July
16, 1984. Thereafter, appellant Daniels filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition, and the respondent Deseret made a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal on the grounds that the said Summary Judgment was
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not final.

This Court dismissed the appeal as being premature by

order suggesting therein that the lower court judge reconsider the
matter in the light of recent decision of this Court.

See Pate v.

Marathon Steel, 692 P2d 765 (Utah 1984).
The lower court, Judge Billings presiding, has now
certified the Summary Judgment as being final by Order entered on
or about the 18th day of August, 1986, (R.281-282) and thereafter
Daniels filed Notice of Appeal on September 17, 1986, as Case No.
86-0466 (R.284-286).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 3, 1982, the defendant/third-party
plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels, filed and recorded a Notice of Lien
(copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto) in the office
of the Summit County Recorder, claiming $80,253 owing to him as
general contractor for construction of an eight-plex condominium
upon said tract and further claiming that the first work was
performed on August 26, 1980, and the last work on December 1,
1981 (R.73-74).
Daniels completed the work on the eight-plex in the
summer of 1981, and normally his mechanics lien should have been
filed within 100 days thereafter.

However, the owner, who was

trying to obtain refinancing, before expiration of said 100-day
period requested that Daniels not lien the property and
represented that if he would refrain from doing so, he would be
paid in two weeks.

In reliance thereon Daniels did not lien the
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property within the normal 100 days provided by the Utah lien law
(R.64-68, 136, 174). These facts give rise to Daniels Point II
regarding estoppel.
Thereafter, on or about December 1, 1981, the pipes in
the eight-plex froze.

The owner called Daniels. The owner

claimed that Daniels had not properly completed the job, thus
resulting in said frozen pipes, and requested that he return to
the job site. Accordingly Daniels returned on December 1, 1981,
to seek the cause and extent of damage, which he did, and while
there made estimates of cost, called subcontractors and made
inquiries regarding insurance (R.65-68, 73, 173, 181-184).
The trust deeds (under which third-party defendant,
Deseret, claims) were executed on February 22, 1982, and the said
instruments were recorded on March 1, 1982, almost one month after
recording of the Notice of Lien of Daniels. (R.150)
The instant action was commenced by CEN Corporation
against Daniels and certain other defendants on or about February
25, 1982, whereby said plaintiff sought to cancel of record the
mechanics lien filed by Daniels, together with certain other
relief. (R.l-8) as noted.

Defendant Daniels filed an Answer and

Counterclaim asking the court to adjudge the validity of said
mechanic's lien and for foreclosure thereof. (R.35-37)
In said Answer and Counterclaim Daniels asserted that
his mechanics lien was timely filed and valid in all respects. In
that connection it was the contention of Daniels that he as a
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general contractor had done sufficient work in December so that
the filing date on February 3f 1982, was timely.

In addition

defendant asserted another ground which counsel felt was
sufficiently set forth in the original Answer and Counterclaim,
but in order to avoid any uncertainty the additional claim was set
forth in an Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim in the following
language:
"As a Third Defense, defendant, Jack C. Daniels,
alleges as follows:
"Prior to expiration of the statutory period for
filing a mechanic's lien in this matter, Michael McCoy,
in behalf of plaintiff's predecessors, to-wit, Michael
McCoy, Kenneth Sitzberger, and Resort Consultants, Ltd.,
and/or Park Avenue Development, and/or 1039 Park Avenue
Development, requested defendant not to file a
mechanic's lien within the time permitted by law and
stated to him that if he would refrain from filing, his
claim would be paid within two weeks. Plantiff's said
predecessors have failed to honor that representation
and this defendant has been paid nothing and was
required to file a lien, and by virtue of the aforesaid
circumstances the period for filing mechanic's lien has
been extended, and defendant's mechanic's lien has been
timely filed under the circumstances of this case, or in
the alternative the plaintiff and its predecessors are
estopped to assert that said mechanic's lien was not
timely filed." (R.84)
In June, 1983, this court granted leave to Daniels to
further amend his pleadings herein, particularly to join Deseret
and certain other third-party defendants.

An Amended Answer,

Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint was thereafter filed
adopting the Answer and Counterclaim and the aforesaid Amendment
to Answer and Counterclaim (R.149-152) and seeking foreclosure of
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his lien against Deseret and other parties asserting claims to the
property.
Two depositions of Daniels were taken in this case, the
first on May 13, 1982, the relevant pages from which were incorporated with plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, which motion
was denied (R.60-71).

The second was taken September 30, 1983,

and (in connection with the argument of Deseretfs Motion to
Dismiss) was published by order of the Court on March 5, 1984.
(R.244)

Hereafter said depositions will be referred to as Daniels

deposition 1 and Daniels deposition 2.
Finally there is some additional testimony in the record
from the deposition of Michael R. McCoy, an agent and officer of
plaintiff, CEN Corporation, (and also a general partner in its
predecessor in title) which appears in Daniels1 Memorandum in
Opposition to Deseret's Motion to Dismiss (R.174), which will be
cited hereinafter in some detail.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I.

Daniels contends that the work performed by

him on December 1, 1982, subsequent to the freezing of the pipes
in the eight-plex, was a part of his original contract, was
substantial, and was the type of work contemplated by our lien
statute, Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, and accordingly
December 1, 1981, was the day upon which the statutory 100-day
period commenced to run, and therefore his mechanics lien filed
February 3, 1982, was timely.

At the very least it cannot be said
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as a matter of law that there is no reasonable possibility that a
fact finder could so find, and accordingly Daniels is entitled to
a trial on the foregoing issues.
Point II. Daniels was requested by the then-owner of
the property not to timely file his mechanics lien and told that
if he would so refrain, he would be paid within two weeks. That
conduct of the then-owner, acting through his authorized agent,
constitutes an estoppel, and Deseretf who acquired its interest in
the property approximately one month after the Daniels mechanics
lien was filed, takes subject to whatever rights Daniels is able
to establish with regard to his mechanics lien.

If Daniels is

able to establish an estoppel against plaintiff pursuant to trial
of that issue in the lower court, then Deseret will in like manner
be estopped.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE WORK PERFORMED ON DECEMBER lf 1981, BY

DANIELS WAS SUFFICIENT TO EXTEND HIS LIEN RIGHTS AS A MATTER OF
LAW OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, RAISES A SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE OF FACT
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
It is hornbook law that a summary judgment cannot be
granted if any material issue of fact remains for determination by
the finder of fact.
In Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 17, 492 P2d 980 (1972),
this Court reiterated the rule of this Court with respect to
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summary judgments in the following language (quoting from an
earlier Utah case):
"To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings,
evidence, admissions . . . must show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Such showing
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable
possibility that the loser could win if given a trial."
It is the contention of Daniels that the work done on
December 1, 1981, was part of his original contract because he was
told to go to the job site by plaintiff's predecessor, Michael
McCoy, who claimed that the water damage was Daniels1 fault as he
had not completed the job in accordance with his contract; that
Daniels accordingly went to the job site, spent the day working
there to determine the cause and extent of damage and.in making
and obtaining costs estimates; that thereafter the aforesaid McCoy
sued Daniels in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Case No.
C-82-4628 (R.173, 181-184), claiming that Daniels had not done the
work to plaintiff's satisfaction.

It is Daniels' claim that

plaintiff's predecessor, having prevailed upon him to go back to
the job site and put in a days' work, claiming that Daniels had
not properly completed the job, is estopped to deny that the work
so performed is not a part of the original contract, and his
successors in interest are likewise so estopped.
We respectfully submit that it cannot be said as a
matter of law there there is no reasonable "possibility" that a
fact finder could find that Daniels returned to the job site by
reason of the claim of plaintiff's predecessor that he had not
-9-

properly completed the job, and that while there he performed a
day's labor by reason of those claims.
Furthermore, the work done on December 1, 1981, was of
the kind contemplated by our lien statute and was "substantial."
On February 3, 1982, Daniels recorded a Notice of Lien
in the Summit County Recorder's office claiming $80,253 owing to
him as general contractor for construction of an eight-plex
condominium in Park City.

In pleadings in the lower court

appellant asserted that the lien was timely filed because
substantial work was done at the request of the owners on December
1, 1981, (which would place the date of filing of the lien within
the 100-day statutory period provided by Section 38-1-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended).
Our lien statute, 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, provides
as follows:
"Contractors, subcontractors and all persons
performing any services or furnishing any materials used
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in
any mainner; all persons who shall do work or furnish
materials for the prospecting, development, preservation
or working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas
well, or deposit; and licensed architects and engineers
and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans,
maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost,
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other
like professional services, or bestowed labor, shall
have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which
they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished
materials, for the value of the service rendered, labor
performed or materials furnished by each respectively,
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor or
otherwise. Such liens shall attach only to such
interest as the owner may have in the property, but the
-10-

interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit,
whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the
purposes of this chapter include products mined and
excavated while the same remain upon the premises
included within the lease." (Emphasis added.)
All parties agree that the Court below held that:
"On or about December 1 of that year [1982], several
pipes at the condominium burst. The owners of the
condominium contacted Daniels, and requested that he
begin the necessary work to make adequate repairs.
Daniels, as set out in his deposition of September 30,
1983, [Daniels deposition 2] indicates that he contacted
several subcontractors in anticipation of beginning
work." Memorandum Decision, page 2 (R.234)
The second Daniels deposition sets forth the fact that
he went upon the premises, called Deseret to verify whether or not
insurance would cover the broken water pipes, contacted other
contractors, made estimates and lined up other subcontractors to
go to work.

The process took all of one day. (Daniels deposition

2, pages 65 to 68, 73)
Notwithstanding that the foregoing clearly makes an
issue of fact, whether or not that day's work by Daniels extended
the lien period, the trial court considered that day's work
meaningless because in his opinion, "nor did the services add
directly to the value of the property, the work done in December
of '81 cannot extend the time period in which Daniels was to have
filed his lien." (Memorandum Decision, R.238)

The lower court did

not seem to feel that the work on December 1, 1981, was not
substantial, just that it was of the wrong kind.
The trial court thus holds that estimates of costs
(supposedly the exclusive basis by which architects may recover),
-11-

could not as a matter of law come within the phrase, "performing
any services" (the words which introduce the whole statute).

The

Court held that such an act by a contractor could not be a basis
for a lien.

In making that assertion the Court cites no law and

is going against the clear, unambiguous meaning of the statute
itself.

The trial court seems to be holding that contractors,

subcontractors and other persons performing "any" services
nevertheless cannot recover unless such services are equivalent to
pounding nails or visually "improving" the property.

This would

lead to an unconscionable result and would seem to require all
contractors, general and sub, to see to it that they took a
"hammer" on the job and at some point pounded a nail in order to
guarantee some sort of lien right.

Proper construction of said

Section 38-1-3 does not, we feel, compel nor permit the result
that only architects, engineers and artisans may lien for
estimates of costs, plans, maps and so on.

We do not feel the

legislature intended that contractors and subcontractors not be
able to lien a project for

"services" that would come in the

category of estimates of cost, drawings, specifications, maps,
plans, designs, etc. The process of estimating cost is one done
equally as frequently by contractors and subcontrctors as by
architects, engineers and artisans, and for that kind of service
to be lienable for one class and not for the other would indeed
make our lien statute constitutionally repugnant as special
legislation.
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In opposition to the trial court's reasoning is this
Court's opinion in the case of Zions First National Bank v.
Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395f 464 P2d 387 (1970).

Speaking through

Justice Callister the court held:
"The trial court properly construed Section 38-1-3,
UCA, 1953, insofar as it held that an architect may file
a lien upon the property concerning which he has
rendered professional service, although his plans may
not be brought to fruition by erection of a building.
However, the judgment of the district court may not be
sustained, since under the facts and circumstances there
is no basis to conclude that Design Securities
Corporation impliedly authorized its lessee, Artcol, to
engage an architect so as to bind the lessor's interest
in respect to the service rendered." (Emphasis added.)
The main opinion then goes on to consider the former
architect's lien law that became consolidated with the lien of
other claimants such as contractors, suppliers, etc., in the 1953
codification.

The prior architect's law indicated that the

standard regarding the services relating to plans, designs,
estimate's, etc., hinged on language such as "with respect to" or
"concerning" the property and was not delimited to the requirement
that some ground be broken or benefit bestowed.
Nowhere in the whole of Section 38-1-3 is there a
provision or any language requiring that an improvement or benefit
must have been conferred upon land before liens can apply as the
trial court herein has held.
The related case of Calder Bros. Company vs. Anderson,
652 P2d 922 (Utah, 1982), as well contains no "benefit conferred "
requirement.

The Court said:
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"For contractor's lien to relate back to the
commencement of work or supplying of materials by
another contractor, however, both contractors1 projects
must have been performed in connection with what is
essentially a single project performed under a common
plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without
material abandonment, (cases cited) Ordinary
maintenance or cleanup work does not serve as a basis
for 'tacking' so as to fix an earlier lien date under
38-1-5 for labor and materials supplied." (Emphasis
added.)
POINT II. A BENEFICIARY OF A TRUST DEED (MORTGAGEE) WHO
ACQUIRES ITS INTEREST SUBSEQUENT TO RECORDING OF NOTICE OF LIEN
TAKES SUBJECT TO WHATEVER RIGHTS CONTRACTOR IS ABLE TO ESTABLISH
THEREUNDER, AND IF TRUSTOR OF TRUST DEED (MORTGAGOR) IS ESTOPPED
TO ASSERT LATE FILING OF MECHANICS LIEN AS A DEFENSE THERETO, THEN
SUCH BENEFICIARY (MORTGATEE) IS LIKEWISE ESTOPPED.
In his Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim Daniels
asserted:
"As a Third Defense, defendant, Jack C. Daniels,
alleges as follows:
"Prior to expiration of the statutory period
for filing a mechanic's lien in this matter, Michael
McCoy, in behalf of plaintiff's predecessors, to-wit,
Michael McCoy, Kenneth Sitzberger, and Resort
Consultants, Ltd., and/or Park Avenue Development,
and/or 1039 Park Avenue Development, requested defendant
not to file a mechanic's lien within the time permitted
by law and stated to him that if he would refrain from
filing, his claim would be paid within two weeks.
Plantiff's said predecessors have failed to honor that
representation and this defendant has been paid nothing
and was required to file a lien, and by virtue of the
aforesaid circumstances the period for filing mechanic's
lien has been extended, and defendant's mechanic's lien
has been timely filed under the circumstances of this
case, or in the alternative the plaintiff and its
predecessors are estopped to assert that said mechanic's
lien was not timely filed." (R.84)
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For purposes of summary judgment the allegations of
Daniels' pleadings must be taken as true.

In this case, however,

there was ample corroboratory evidence, both from Daniels and
Michael McCoy, agent for plaintiff, to demonstrate the truth of
that pleading.

Pages 24 through 29 of the first Daniels

deposition (R.64-68) set out the essentials of the pleadings cited
above.

It was repeated again in Daniels1 Answers to

Interrogatories as follows:
"I had a conversation with Mr. McCoy over the telephone,
as indicated in my deposition, the substance of which
was that Mr. McCoy requested that I not take any action
to enforce my mechanics lien rights, in return for which
he would see that I got paid. In reliance thereon, I
did not enforce my mechanics lien rights at that time,
but Mr. McCoy has refused to keep his commitment. For
further details of this and other conversations, see my
deposition heretofore taken in this matter." (R.136)
That position is buttressed by the testimony of Michael
R. McCoy, agent of plaintiff and owner:
"A. And I basically told Mr. Daniels that if the
permanent financing was not put in place, or the
project wasn't sold and the building went into
default, everybody would lose everything and my
investors would probably lose a quarter of a million
dollars or more.
"Q. Did you ever say anything to Mr. Daniels asking him
to delay taking action on its building by way of
lien or other effort to try to collect this claim?
"A. I basically told Mr. Daniels not to make waves with
the bank, is the tone of my conversation." (R.174)
Thus, in the lower court Daniels raised in his pleadings
an issue of estoppel as against plaintiff from asserting late
filing of his mechanics lien.

Plaintiff denied those issues, and
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inasmuch as they involved questions of fact no determination has
yet been made of those issues since this matter has never been
tried.
Deseret argued that even though plaintiff might be
estopped to assert late filing of the mechanics lien, that would
nevertheless not constitute an estoppel against Deseret because
Deseret had not been a party to the conduct giving rise to the
estoppel.

The trial court apparently adopted that argument as the

Court stated in its Memorandum Decision at page 238 of the record
as follows:
"'In support of this proposition, Daniels cites the
case of Beltline Brick Co. vs. Standard Home Building,
213 N.W. 41 Minnesota, 1927. This seems to be contrary
to Utah law. See Smith v. Oregon Shortline Railroad
Co., 30 Utah 246, 84 P 108 (1906), and Utah Savings &
Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P2d 598
(1961). The court in Smith v. Oregon Shortline, stated
that in order to establish an estoppel against a mortgagee, the lien claimant must establish certain facts.
He must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act
or declaration by the mortgagee. There is no evidence
to indicate that any of these events occurred. If the
law were to the contrary, it would allow owners and
individual mechanic lien claimants to determine the
priority of other lien claimants, whether they were
other mechanics lien claimants, or holders of trust
deeds and mortgages. This could create confusion in the
law, which would be intolerable." (Emphasis added.)
It is therefore apparent that the Court did not purport
to rule on whether or not Daniels could assert a valid claim of
estoppel against plaintiff, and indeed could not make a ruling on
that point.

The lower court has in effect ruled that a subsequent

mortgagee, even though it takes with notice from a mortgagor who
is estopped to assert a statute of limitations as to the filing of
-16-

a lien by reason of its conduct nevertheless takes free and clear
of such estoppel unless a subsequent mortgagee somehow
participated in the conduct giving rise to the estoppel.
We believe the lower court to be in error in this
ruling.
As to whether or not Deseret was aware of the
transaction we wish to point out that Section 57-3-2, Utah Code
Annotated (1953) as amended, provides as follows:
"Every conveyance, or intrument in writing
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title,
and every patent to lands within this state duly
executed and verified according to law, and every
judgment, order or decree of any court of record in this
state, or a copy thereof, required by law to be recorded
in the office of the county recorder, and every
financing statement which complies with the provisions
of section 70A-9-402 shall, from the time of filing the
same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all
persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent
purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed
to purchase and take with notice." (Emphasis added.)
By reason of the foregoing, Deseret, having entered into
a loan transaction with the owner of the property on February 22,
1982, is a "subsequent mortgagee" within the meaning of the
aforesaid statute and therefore "shall be deemed to purchase and
take with notice" of the claim of Daniels recorded almost one
month prior.
It is thus clear that third-party defendant, Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan, when it recorded its Trust Deed one month
after appellant's Notice of Lien was filed, took subject to
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whatever appellant can prove with regard to his lien.

The lower

court in its Memorandum Decision at page 6 stated that in order
for appellant to establish an estoppel that would be binding
against Deseret, appellant had to prove that Deseret was somehow
responsible for the estoppel.

As noted, the Court stated that

appellant "must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act
or declaration by the mortgagee.

There is no evidence to indicate

that any of these events occurred."
(R.238).

See Memorandum Decision

There is of course no evidence to indicate that Deseret

committed the estoppel.

Appellant is only asserting that the

predecessor in interest of Deseret committed the acts giving rise
to the estoppel, and Deseret, having full notice of the lien,
takes subject to whatever appellant is able to establish for that
lien.

We respectfully submit that that is axiomatic in this

state.
The Court further stated starting on page 6 of the
Court's Memorandum Decision: (R.238-9)
"If the law were to the contrary it would allow
owners and individual mechanic lien claimants to
determine the priority of other lien claimants, whether
they were other mechanic lien claimants, or holders of
trust deeds and mortgages. This would create confusion
in the law, which would be intolerable."
The foregoing statement by the Court is totally meaningless so far as we have been able to determine, and if anything is
going to create an intolerable situation, it is to allow a
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee to take free and clear of the
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claims of prior recorded liens. That will totally nullify the
recording act and really bring confusion into the law.
Under the foregoing circumstances Deseretfs rights in
and to the property are subject to any right which Daniels is able
to establish pursuant to said Notice of Lien.

Deseret, having

loaned against the property and knowing of the claim of Daniels,
takes subject to whatever consequences may flow in law from the
facts of which the record gives notice.
In support of appellant's position we cite the case of
Ochoa v. Hernandez Y. Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 57 L.Ed. 1427, 33
S.Ct. 1033, which stands for the proposition that a subsequent
lienholder takes subject to whatever consquences may flow in law
from the facts of which the record gives notice.
If Daniels is able to establish the validity of his
lien, it is binding upon all persons taking with notice thereof.
In addition Deseret is on notice of any and all matters which the
recorded instrument suggests to a person of ordinary prudence of
the need to make further inquiry.

That of course is a matter of

reasonableness and good faith and is at the very least an issue of
fact upon which the court could not rule on a motion to dismiss.
Although discovery was never completed with respect to
the Third-Party Complaint, it seems certain that Deseret would not
refinance the property (as it did) without a title report.
Further, a rather frantic and unorthodox campaign was launched to
have the Court nullify the lien and substitute in its place a
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personal and unsecured bond of McCoy and his associatef Doms
(R.9).

Judge Dee actually granted their request ex parte (R.13),

but the request was denied by Judge Baldwin after hearing (R.138).
No doubt this effort was to enable Deseret to acquire its interest
without being subordinate to the mechanics lien.

When that

approach failed, the mechanics lien was no doubt insured around.
It thus appears certain that Deseret also had actual notice.
Whatever interest Deseret may have in the property in
question it has derived from the owner of the property, to-wit,
plaintiff.

Furthermore, it entered into a loan transaction

whereby plaintiff owes Deseret certain sums pursuant to promissory
notes.

It must therefore be evident to everyone that Deseret and

plaintiff have established a relationship of privity of contract,
and furthermore it must be obvious that they have established a
relationship of privity of estate.

Privity of estate exists in

those circumstances where a mutual or successive interest exists
in the same property.

Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., defines

privity:
"Mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property. 1 Greenl.Ev. § 189; Duffy v. Blake,
91 Wash. 140, 157 P. 480, 482; Haverhill v. International Ry. Co., 217 App.Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522,
523."
Whatever interest Deseret may have by virtue of its
trust deeds at one time belonged to plaintiff as plaintiff is the
entity who granted those rights to Deseret.

It must therefore be

conceded that Deseret has succeeded to those rights from plaintiff
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and no one else. The trust deed states in part that plaintiff
"irrevocably grants and conveys to trustee, in trust, with power
of sale, the following described property located in the county of
Summit, State of Utah."

It should be noted that in the trust deed

Deseret is both trustee and beneficiary.

Deseret is clearly in

privity of contract and estate with plaintiff.
Elwell v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 28 SE 833
(1847), is a case where the owner of a certain tract gave a deed
by way of security (in other words, as a mortgage) to New England
Mortgage.

Thereafter a suit was commenced against the owner and a

judgment of ejectment obtained by a third party.
That action involved a determination of rights of the
judgment creditor against New England, the holder of the security
interest.

The court stated:

"This reasoning applies with equal force to the
present case, where the deed was given to secure a debt;
and we think, therefore, that, the deed having been made
before the commencement of the action in ejectment
against the grantor, the grantee is not concluded or
estopped by the judgment. He is privy in estatee only
with respect to the estate at the time of the execution
of the security deed, or to what is the legitimate
result of its status at that time." (Emphasis added.)
Applying that to this case, although Deseret may not be
in privity with plaintiff as to actions of plaintiff taken after
February 22, 1982, (or perhaps even March 1, 1982), Deseret is in
privity with plaintiff as to the state of its title on February
22, 1982, when it received its trust deeds.

The title of

plaintiff was on that date encumbered with the mechanics lien of
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Daniels, and Deseret takes subject to whatever the court holds in
this action, as between plaintiff and Daniels on the matter of the
validity of the mechanic's lien, a matter yet to be tried.
There is no question that the estoppel transaction
resulted in a benefit to the owner of the property because the
owner specifically requested that the lien not be filed, and it
was not filed.

The owner apparently did not wish to have a

mechanics lien against the property, apparently because it was
negotiating for more money and did not desire to have that process
disturbed.

It is of course not necessary that an actual contract

with consideration be proved to establish an estoppel. All that
is necessary is that a representation be made with the intent that
it be relied uponf which is certainly a circumstance set forth in
Daniels' pleadings.
The case of Beltline Brick Company v. Standard Home
Building Company, 213 NW 41 (Minn. 1927) is on all fours with the
instant case although labeled without justification by the lower
court as an "aberration."
In the Beltline case the plaintiff furnished brick for
the construction of a building owned by defendant's predecessor in
title.

The defense was that the plaintiff had not filed a lien

statement within the 90 days required by the local statute. The
court stated in that case:
"The court found that there was an implied
agreement between the parties, arising out of such
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transaction, to extend the time for filing a lien
statement, that the building company is, by its conduct
estopped to assert or contend that such brick was not
furnished for use upon the premises or that the lien
statement was filed too late, and that the defendant,
Ella T. Robitschek, is a grantee after the filing of
said lien statement, is also subject to such estoppel.
Upon these matters the evidence amply sustains the
findings and the findings support the conclusion."
If Beltline is an "aberration," then so too is Smith vs.
Oregon Shortline Railroad Co., 30 Ut 246, 84 P 108 (1906), a case
which involved a dispute regarding a section of railroad road bed.
The facts in Smith were that some 30 years prior to the action the
appellant railroad company's predecessor (also a railroad company)
came upon the land of the respondent's predecessor, simply took
the land, laid its tracks out upon it, and used the same for 25
years—all without objection from the then-landowner, respondent's
predecessor.

Approximately 25 years later the appellant railroad

company came upon the premises and enlarged the roadbed, and in so
doing, took an additional strip on each side of approximately 4
and 8 feet respectively—again without objection by the thenlandowner, respondent's predecessor.

Thereafter respondent

acquired the property and brought suit, not only to reacquire the
said strips which had been taken most recently, but to acquire the
entire roadbed which had been taken some 30 years before. The
court allowed the respondent to recover back the strips taken
several years prior, but ruled against the respondent as to the
roadbed taken approximately 30 years before.
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The court stated:

"As to this portion of the tract the findings show
that it was entered upon 30 years ago, permanent and
valuable improvements were made thereon, and it was,
during all that time, continuously and exclusively
occupied by the appellant and its predecessors for
railroad purposes without objection or interruption. From
these facts, a license to occupy may well be implied, and,
at the time of the conveyance, respondent's grantor would
be estopped from ejecting the appellant. . . . Of course,
if respondent's grantor at the time of his conveyance was
estopped from maintaining an action of ejectment for the
additional strips taken, then likewise is the respondent
estopped from maintaining such action." (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing it is clear where the respondent's
predecessor was estopped, the subsequent owner was likewise
estopped.

As plaintiff is estopped, so too is Deseret.

We

believe Beltline and Smith state the law, and are not
"aberrations."
Finally, we desire to point out (although the lower
court has not ruled otherwise, and presumably will not) that Rice
v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P2d 159, stands for
the proposition that a Statute of Limitation can be waived by oral
statements and conduct, and we believe the same rule applies to
the time prescribed for filing a mechanics lien.

In Rice the

plaintiff was damaged or injured by the negligence of an employee
of the defendant school district was repeatedly assured by the
insurance adjuster that she would be compensated for her damages
as soon as they were ascertained and was therefore led beyond the
statutory filing period under the Governmental Immunity Act of the
State of Utah before she in fact filed her action.
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The school

board then raised the limitations aspect of the Act as a defense.
The Utah Supreme Court, speaking on that issue, said:
"Even if the one-year limitation of Section 63-3015 be deemed mandatory, this court has previously held:
. . . Waiver or estoppel may be found in the face of a
mandatory statute. For instance, statutes of limitation
ordinarily are mandatory both in form and effect.
Nevertheless, they may be waived or the party may be
estopped from relying upon them." (The court then by
footnote cites several Utah cases.)
The court then continues:
"Hence the filing of the claim within ninety days,
while mandatory upon the claimant and a condition
precedent to his cause of action, is nothing more than a
procedural requirement as to the agency, which, as to
the claimant may be excused by estoppel.
"In Benner v. Industrial Ace. Comm., supra, 26 Cal
2d 346, 349, 159 P2d 24, 26, the court said, fWhere, as
here, the delay in commencing action was induced by the
conduct of the party sought to be charged the latter may
not invoke such conduct to defeat recovery. An estoppel
may arise although there was no designed fraud on the
part of the person sought to be estopped. To create an
equitable estoppel, 'it is enough if the party has been
induced to refrain from using such means or taking such
action as lay in his power, by which he might have
retrieved his position and saved himself from loss1
. . . f It is well-settled that a person by his conduct
may be estopped to rely upon these defenses. Where the
delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of
the defendant, it cannot be availed of by him as a
defense.1" (The court then by footnote alludes to a
series of California cases supporting that view.)
(Emphasis in original.)
The court then concludes:
"The trial court erred by an entry of summary
judgment in behalf of the defendant. This case is
reversed and remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion."
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CONCLUSION
We therefore respectfully submit that the lower court
erred in granting Deseret's Motion to Dismiss. We respectfully
submit that the pleadingsf depositions and the documents on file
in this action at the very least raise a substantial issue of fact
as to whether the work performed by Daniels on December lr 1986,
was substantial and part of the original contract by reason of the
claim of the plaintiff that defendant had not properly completed
the contract.
Furthermore, we believe that the work performed was of
the kind contemplated by Section 38-1-3.
We further respectfully submit that the trial court
erred in ruling that even though plaintiff might be estopped
through its conduct from asserting the defense of late filing of
the mechanics lien, that Deseret was nevertheless not estopped
unless it participated in such conduct, such being clearly against
the weight of authority in this state and generally.
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that
the Summary Judgment of the lower court be reversed and the matter
be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted:

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Appellant
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day of January, 1987:
A. Dean Jeffs
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George A. Hunt
Post Office Box 3000
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Attorney for Appellant
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NOTICE OF LIEN

\:uj;

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned.

/

Z

toJjk„_(Li_JLajlifJ^..--..J_.iL-Cj3Ln^.trjuLC.tion

General Contractor
_and residing at
_Jlfe^±.jJj^olan
County of £al_t-.Lflj£j_
..State of Utah, hereby claim—
and intend.... to hold and claim a lien upon that certain land and premises, owned and reputed to be
owned b y . 2 2 L u ^ O ^
and
situate, lying and being in
2axk.ili.ty:
, County of.
-Summit
State of Utah, described as follows, to wit:
1039 Park Avenue, flight Unit Condominium Park C i t y , Utah
Lots 8 . 9 . 10. 1 3 . ? 4 . ?5 and the Southern o n e - h a l f ( l / 2 )
of l o t s 11 and ? ? , Block 4 , Park City Survey, a c c o r d i n g t o
1 - t h e r e g i o n fJJjt_J-M,
Recorder's O f f i c e .

doing business as..

\&
\O<XUJL&*}
f > V . i € C \ St»»-%I1T CO. RECORDER

TRDCTHTrZ

rAKTRACl

-&3.SU25Z+Q£L
to secure the payment of the sum of
owing to the undersigned for -C.QJD.jit.ru.c_t.Lo.-n. ftf. Mgh-__rl
General
as a_
in, on and about the_

^ " ™

V

*

Dollars,
?.Dd_unlaiuuL«

Contractor
December l f

1981

_on said land.

That the said indebtedness accrued and the undersigned furnished said materials to (or was em(ErmM according to ihm fact)

ployed by)

Jack C. D a n i e l s - J D C o n s t r u c t i o n
_who was the

Contractor
owner and the reputed owner of said premises as
aforesaid, under a-Bu.il.ding
contract made between the said Development
Company
and the undersigned
on the. 8th__.day of—August.
, 19 3.0, by the terms of which the undersigned did agree
to
c o n s t r u c t e i g h t u n i t condominium
and the said.
did agree to pay the undersigned therefor as follows, to wit:__.Si.xtX-.d.aX3..^f±fi.E...tili-S
.Co a i r a r t was f n 1 f.ilLe_d
and under which said contract the underthe firstJ.ab_o_r..&„m„ater_iaJLs_.on the
2_£.tb
day of
on the
_Augus-t-L9.8J2.and did
fjirni sh
-the last„
-XaWr-.
~L?A ...day of
tiec.embe.r.„i..9.8.1.
_
_ and on and between said last mentioned
furnish labor
. amounting
days, did
Dollars,
to the sum of
l?-9.».15_l:„9-9.-

signed did......f.urn i.sh

which was the reasonable value thereof, and on which the following payments have been made to wit:
NONE
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of—...&8D.+.2.5J2L.Q.Q
.
_
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which
demand the undersigned hold.... and claim... a lien by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, of Title
38, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.
'Jack C. Daniels - J I) Construction
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDnrfTttr-Ea-S-TR.!.©
Deeui* ctetti

IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CEN CORPORATION,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CIVIL NO. 6790
^ vs.
JACK C. DANIELS, et al.,
Defendants.
JACK C. DANIELS,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs .
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Third Party Defendants

This action was brought by the plaintiff to determine among
other things, the validity of a lien filed by defendant Daniels
on February 3, 1982. Daniels then brought a third party action
against third party defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
Association.
The undisputed facts are that Daniels is a contractor who
performed certain services, and furnished labor and materials used
in the construction of a building on the real property in 'question.
The project was a condominium located in Summit County, Utah.

#

•
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DANIELS, ET AL
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The deposition of Jack Daniels indicates that by the end of July,
1981 all construction pursuant to the Building Contract Agreement
had been completed.

Certificates of Final Inspection and Occupancy

were issued by the City of Park City, Utah.
On or about December 1st of that year, several pipes in the
condominium burst.

The owners of the condominium contacted Daniels,

and requested that he begin the necessary work to make adequate
repairs.

Daniels, as set out in h'is deposition of September 30,

1983, indicates that he contacted several subcontractors in
anticipation of beginning work.

Prior to any work being done on

the project by any contractors or subcontractors, the owners
advised him that he did not need to make the repairs for reasons
best known to themselves.
As indicated above, Daniels filed his mechanic's lien
on February 3, 1982, and shortly thereafter Deseret Federal filed
its Trust Deed.
Daniels also claims that the time in which he could file his
mechanic1s lien was extended by virtue of an agreement he had
with the owners.
Deseret Federal now moves to dismiss claiming that Daniels1
mechanic's lien was not timely filed.
Daniels counters by saying that the last work done on the
project was done in December of 1981, and further he was given an
extension of time by the owners in which to file his lien.

CEN CORPORATION VS.
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A careful review of the facts shows that the project was
completed in July of 1981, and that the work the owners wanted done
in December of 1981 was not a continuation of the earlier project,
but merely repairs.

If repairs to a completed project could be

construed as extending the time in which a mechanic!s lien could
be filed, mechanic's liens could be filed many years after a
project had been completed.

Therefore, the lien in question could

relate back only to the amount of 'work done during December of 1981.
Deseret Federal, however, claims that the lien is invalid
since no work was actually done by Daniels on the project.

It

is undisputed that no improvements were made to the project, and
that Daniels' only involvement was to contact various subcontractors
and craftsmen.
A close reading of Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, indicates that there are three distinct categories of
persons who are entitled to file a lien in situations of this type.
Addressing them in reverse order, these persons are licensed
architects, engineers and artisans who furnish designs, plats,
plans and estimates of costs.

The next category are those persons

involved in mining, and the location and/or working of oil and gas
deposits.

The last category, which is mentioned first in the

statute, is the category of contractors, subcontractors and
all other persons.

In this Court's opinion, Daniels falls in

the contractors category.

The only other category he could possibly
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fall into would be on the basis that he provided an estimate of
costs.

Construing the deposition of Mr. Daniels in his favor, the

Court must conclude that he was not hired to furnish an estimate of
costs, but rather to make repairs.

This Court believes that the

correct interpretation of the statute is that to fall within the
third category in the statute in question, a person must be one
hired specifically to estimate costs.

To rule otherwise would

mean that a contractor who takes on a job on a cost-plus basis,
and without telling the owner what the cost of the project would be,
would be in one category, whereas the contractor who gave a bid
would fall in another category in the event both were to file a lien
for the work they performed in contacting subcontractors.

To

reach such a result would seem to be nonsensical and absurd.
For this reason, this Court believes that the only conclusion that
can be reached is that Mr. Daniels falls within the first category
mentioned in the statute.
The second and third categories differ from the first category
in one notable way.

That is the requirement placed upon those

falling within the first category that the services, materials or
equipment must be "used in the construction, alteration or
improvement of any building or structure or improvement."

This

requirement is not typical to the second two categories.
There is a brief statement of the legislative history of
the predecessor of the statute in question contained in Zions First

^oO
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National Bank vs. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970).
Based upon this legislative history, it would appear that the
distinction between the first category and the second and third
categories is that on many occasions engineers and architects do
a substantial amount of work which does not per se improve the
property, and further is not visible upon an inspection of the
property.

An architect and engineer may work many months in

preparing plans, preparing renderings, and making computations.
In fact, the bulk of the work done by an architect and engineer,
with the exception of supervision, is done off the property site.
This likewise holds true for work done on mining claims for oil
and gas deposits.

A geologist may spend many hours reviewing

maps and locate prior deposits in a neighboring region, and yet
never visit the site.

For these reasons, this Court is of the

opinion that the distinction between the first category and the
second and third categories is a valid one, which takes into account
the problems of those persons involved in the construction and
design of real estate projects, as well as the development of
mining and fossil fuel deposits.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the
opinion that Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson, supra, does
not apply to the facts here.

In Zions First National Bank, the

lien claimant involved fell into the third category rather than
the first.

It is for this reason that the Court stated that the
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plans for the erection of a building need not be used in the
erection of the building;
It appears to this Court that since the activities of Daniels
in December of 1981 are not services used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of the building, nor did the services
add directly to the value of the property, the work done in
December of 1981 cannot extend the time period in which Daniels was
to have filed his lien.

See, Cald'er Brothers vs. Anderson,

652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) .
Daniels also makes the claim that if the lien was not timely
filed, Deseret Federal is estopped from making that claim since
Daniels had an agreement with the owners which allowed for the
late filing of a lien.

In support of this proposition, Daniels

cites the case of Beltline Brick Company vs. Standard Home Building,
213 N.W. 41 (Minn. 1927).

This seems to be contrary to Utah law.

See, Smith vs. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 30 Utah 246,
84 P. 108 (1906), and Utah Savings and Loan Association vs. Mecham
12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961).

The court in Smith vs. Oregon,

Short Line, stated that in order to establish an estoppel against
a mortgagee, the lien claimant must establish certain facts.

He

must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act or
declaration by the mortgagee.

There is no evidence to indicate

that any of these events occurred.

If the law were to the contrary,

it would allow owners and individual mechanic lien claimants to
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determine the priority of other lien claimants, whether they were
other mechanic lien claimants, or holders of trust deeds and
mortgages.

This would create confusion in the law, which would be

intolerable.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the lien
of Daniels is null and void as to Deseret Federal.
Federal's Motion is granted.

Deseret

Counsel for Deseret Federal is

directed to prepare an Order in agcordance with this Decision, and
have the Order either approved as to form, or he should adhere
to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court.
Dated this

b

day of April, 1984.

;HLI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,

this 6~

day of April, 1984

Jeffrey B. Brown
Attorney for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Carman E. Kipp .
Karen McClurg
Attorneys for Michael R. McCoy
600 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Gordon A. Madsen
Robert C. Cummings
Attorneys for Defendant and
Third Party Plaintiff Daniels
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P. 0. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84601
and
George A. Hunt
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
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Defendant Deseret Federal
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CEN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
-vJACK C. DANIELS, et al.,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants,
JACK C. DANIELS,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No.

6790

-vDESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.
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The motion of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal
Savings & Loan Association came on regularly for hearing
before this Court on March 5, 1984, the Honorable Philip R.
Fishier, District Judge, presiding, George A. Hunt of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau and A. Dean Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs
appearing for Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association and Gordon A. Madsen of Madsen & Cummings
appearing for Third-Party Plaintiff Jack Daniels, and the
Court having heard argument of counsel and having reviewed
the memoranda on file with the Court and having requested
supplemental memoranda from counsel and the same having been
filed, and the deposition of Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Jack C. Daniels having been published and the Court being
fully advised in the premises and having rendered its Memorandum
Decision in the matter on April 6, 1984, granting the motion
of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion

to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings &
Loan Association be and the same hereby is granted and judgment
is rendered in its favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff Jack
C. Daniels, no cause of action.
DATED this

%/4 £-

day of April, 1984.
BY THE COURT:
• '1
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

Kay I. Brown, being duly sworn, deposes and states:
that she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Deseret Federal Savings
& Loan Association herein; that she served the attached
Summary Judgment, Summit County District Court, Civil No.
6790 upon the following by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Gordon Madsen, Esq.
320 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roger H. Bullock, Esq.
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Melvin G. Larew, Jr., Esq.
6914 South 3000 East, #205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
James M. Dean, Esq.
61 South Main, #403
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffrey Brown, Esq.
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Carmen E. Kipp, Esq.
Karen J. McClurg
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.
Suite 1000, 10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and mailing the same, postage pre-paid on the 11th day of April,
1984.

yArwv^
1984.

Subscribed and sworn to bef027^ me this 11th day of April,
^

i/A^.
NOTARYZ>UBLIC, r e s i d i n g
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